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the book was part of a seminar on constitutional law. The reader. however. is not in the
seminar. The patchwork and unevenness of the book is not up to Professor Tribe's usual
standards of scholarship.
To conclude, I applaud Professor Tribe for addressing the abortion issue. The debate
needs this learned voice and reasoned temperament. I think he has put his pen on the current
impasse - values have been absolutized and public discourse has been gridlocked . Professor
Tribe's latest book is an attempt to break the gridlock and advance the public debate about
this crucial issue. It can only be hoped that others will work out a better way to resolve the
clash of absolutes . However, Professor Tribe has helped us all to see the issues more clearly.
And in this highly charged area of debate, this is no small achievement.
- William F. Maestri
St. Joseph Seminary College
St. Benedict, La.

Life and Death Decision-Making
Baruch Brody
New York and Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1988, xiix250pp
One expects a high standard of performance from Baruch Brody, and this book does not
disappoint. Brod y is a professor of philosophy at Rice University and professor of
biomedical ethics at the Baylor College of Medicine , both in Houston. His work displays
traces of each , a combination of philosophical acumen with attention to clinical detail. In his
preface Brody stresses the importance of avoiding the twin shortcomings of standard clinical
thinking without attention to relevant moral theory, and abstract philosophical theory
without attention to practical application. Brody succeeds in bringing together a discussion
of the nuances of clinical settings with the use of abstract ethical principles.
The book contains seven chapters; the first four are more theoretical , the last three more
practical. Although the book has considerable merit throughout, by far the best part is the
last three chapters which contain very careful discussions of real cases and exhibit the use of
ethical principles for thinking about the moral responsibilities of the patient, family , and care
givers.
Chapter One is entitled, "The Need for a Moral Theory" and severely criticizes the view
that sound moral thinking about specific cases can get along without a general moral theory.
Decent motivations, a desire to do the right thing, says Brody, are not enough , and he
presents several examples to illustrate the point that our thinking must be guided by the
application of relevant moral principle if our desire to do the right thing stands a hope of
being translated into act.
In this chapter, Brody first mentions his preferred moral theory, which he calls the"Model
of Conflicting Moral Appeals ." According to Brody, there are a number of different morally
important principles that we ought to use in deciding how to act. Brody views these
principles as independent of one another, in that the cogency of anyone of them cannot be
reduced to or founded on the cognency of any of the others. Brody things that someday we
may be able to develop a unified theory that will systematize these independent and
sometimes discordant principles, but he believes that we now are far from possessing one. In
its absence, our best option is to hold that the morally right decision is the decision that most
completely respects whatever moral appeals are relevant to the case at hand.
Chapter Two is important, for in it Brody lists and discusses the five different kinds of
moral appeal that form the bedrock of his system. These are the appeals to (I) consequences

86

Linacre Quarterly

(which include promoting good, avoiding harm, and removing evil), (2) rights, (3) respect for
persons, (4) virtuous action (particularly the virtues of integrity, compassion, courage, and
honesty), and (5) justice and fairness, Brody believes that the shortcomings of other ethical
theories can be traced to their tendency to focus on only one or two of these competing moral
appeals to the wrongful disregard of the others. Brody thinks that the strength of his theory
rests on its being "pluralistic." Perhaps "comprehensive" would be more apt here. Brody
certainly intends to reject the common relativism that would leave moral thinking in the
desperate condition of noting simply that what is right according to my principles is wrong
according to yours.
Chapter Three contains Brody's criticisms of two competing models of moral analysis for
biomedicine. The first of these he calls "the Contractual Model ," which sees all moral issues
as resolvable by appeal to the explicit or implicit terms of the agreement between patient and
provider of health care. The second he calls "the Status Model ," which would reduce all
moral analysis to the social roles of patient and health care provider. Brody's criticisms of
both are that they are insufficiently "pluralistic", that each model by its very nature is blind to
certain relevant moral appeals. The Contractual Model, for instance, tends to ignore certain
aspects of the right to treatment, the virtues of integrity and compassion, respect for persons,
and attention to consequences. Brody brings similar charges against the Status Model, and
his criticisms of both are in the main devastating.
Chapter Four, along with Chapter Two , provides the theoretical heart of Brody's work . In
it he offers most helpful advice about how to weigh the seriousness of competing moral
claims.
In Chapters Five, Six, and Seven, Brody deals with specific cases from his own clinical
experience in order to show the relevance of the competing appeals presented in Chapter
Two. Chapter Five deals with competent adults, some of whom wish to be treated and some
of whom do not. Chapter Six covers cases of incompetent adults, some without families ,
some with families who wish treatment, some with families who do not wish treatment. And
Chapter Seven examines cases of children, some newborns with parents who wish treatment,
some newborns with parents who do not wish treatment, some adolescent or teenage
children.
Each case is extremely well argued. Brody examines the plausible options, considers
reasons favoring and opposing them , and offers his own conclusions. His views are
presented in a non-emotional manner. But he compels the reader to enter into the analysis
and to reflect on the nature of the conflicting moral appeals present in the individual case.
The reader who disagrees with Brody's conclusions finds himself forced to argue on Brody's
own terms. Brody does such a good job of showing the worth and relevance of the different
moral appeals, that no one who attends carefully to Brody's presentation can ignore the
power of his analysis.
Brody's own conclusions will be found acceptable by most adherents of traditional
morality. That is to say, Brody avoids the twin dangers of treat-at-any-cost vitalism on the
one hand , and the abandonment of "useless eaters" on the other. Brody is a clear,
unemotional, and incisive analytic thinker. He also possesses genuine humanity and
wisdom.
But the book has two serious theoretical shortcomings. The first of these Brody takes to be
a strength - that the five sometimes competing moral appeals are all equally fundamental
and irreducible to one another. Our moral theory may not be in the best of shape, but it is not
. quite the hodgepodge Brody makes it out to be. Most importantly, Brody believes that the
twin appeals to rights and to respect for persons are not reducible to one another. Thus,
although the right to life is possessed by all living members of the human species (and
abortion is therefore morally wrong), not all members of the human species are equally
deserving of respect because not all members of the human species are equally capable offree
choice.
The mutual irreducibility of rights and respect for persons generates considerable oddity.
On the one hand, it is morally wrong to kill an irreversibly comatose patient not because
respect is owed him as a person (the power of free choice has been lost forever) but because
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his right to life would be violated. On the other hand . it is morally wrong to assist a patient's
suicide not because his right to life would thus be violated (the patient could waive the right)
but because to do so is to fail to respect him as a person.
All rights. according to Brody, can be waived. The notion of an "inalienable" right , a right
that cannot be alienated or waived , is nonsense in Brody's view, as though "rights are
burdens with which we are stuck" (p. 22). Brody fails to attend to the fact that the status of
personhood can at times appear to be "a burden with which we are stuck," if, for instance, it
prevents us from suicide when we are in intractable pain . Why we can be stuck with the
burden of personhood but not with that of rights is a question to which Brody offers no
answer. Nor does he even think to raise the question of where rights come from except to say
that "rights are relationships between people which exist as correlatives of obligations." But
about what constitutes the grounds of obligations Brody apparently has no idea.
Second. Brody lacks the conceptual tools for analyzing the concept of action because he
fails to understand the role of intentions. This does not lead him into practica l moral error
rega rding his conclusions about the specific cases he treats. But it does mean that for all the
book's strengths, it provides an inadequate theoretical guide for confidence in dealing with
the thorniest practical difficulties.
The ultimate inadequacy of Brody's analysis can be most easily seen in his explication of
th e right to life. Part (but only part) of the right to life is the right not to be killed , which
Brod y defines as follows. "X has a right not to be killed against everyone since everyone has
an obligation not to deprive X of X's life (where that means not to cause the loss of X's life)"
(p.24).
This will not do , and it is essential to see why it will not do . In Brody's view, if the Soviets
were to place East German infants on the turrets of their tanks and send them through the
Fulda Gap, NATO could do nothing to stop the tanks, at least if we assume with Brody that
th e infants possess the right not to be killed (as part of the right to life) and that the right to
life is a fundamental right that may not be violated. To shoot at the tanks would ce rtainly be
to cause the loss of the children's lives, and so would violate their right not to be killed and so
would violate their right to life. One alternative (not Brod y's) is to admit that shooting at the
tanks would be to violate the children's right to life. but that sometimes violation of the right
to life can be justified under conditions of extreme necessity. But that way madness (and the
gas chamber) lies.
Brody confuses the causal act of killing with the moral act of intended killing , The right
not to be killed is (among other things) not the right not to have one's death caused but the
right not to have one's death sought. Reckless disregard of or indifference to another
person's life is also wrong, but the absolute prohibition cannot be interpreted to apply to the
sheer causing of death , as the illustration shows.
The theoretical weakness of Brody's position could be ignored by readers of this journal if
it had implications only for matters of warfare. But inadequacies in the very foundations of a
theory are almost certain to displa y th emselves in a systematic fashion throughout the
vario us fields of application. and this is true in Brody's case.
Consider how Brod y distinguishes active from passive euthanasia. "Active euthanasia is
causing the death of the patient. Passive euthanasia is allowing the patient's disease processes
to kill the patient without intervening to prevent that from happening" (p . 120). Again , we
see Brody attempting to build his analysis on what is caused and not on what is sought.
Wo uld tha deministering of a large dose of morphine be ac tive euthanasia if death is caused
but not so ught? Would failure to turn on the heat in a room so that the patient might co ntract
pneumonia and so die be passive euthanasia but not active? It is both theoretically and
practicall y superior to define the act of e uthanasia by what is intended (death), and leave the
issue of what is caused as a possible side effect to be assessed using the principle of
proportionality.
An article which can be used to explain the defective character of both features of Brody's
theoretical presentation is a work with which everyone in the field of health care ought to be
thoroughly familiar. It is by Richard Stith, entitled "Toward Freedom from Value," was
orig inally published in Thr Jurisl (1978), a nd has been republished in several anthologies.
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It is as important an article as exists in the field of biomedicine. It explains what is involved in
the notion of respect for persons. and defends as one of the paramount principles in
biomedicine (or any other field) - "Do not act . or fail to act . in order that the patient [or any
innocent human] might die ."
Brody's book has much to reco mmend it. This reviewer could not advise anything more
helpful for clinical medicine than Brody's work supplemented by Stith's article.
-Gary Atkinson
Professor of Philosophy
College of St. Thomas
St. Paul, MN

The Homosexual Person:
New Thinking in Pastoral Care
John F, Harvey, O.S.F.S.
Ignatius Press. San Francisco, 249 pp.
For the average citizen, homosexuality is a condition poorly understood, repellent, and
confusing. For this reason, it is essential that this recently published book by Father Harvey
be widely read by physicians, nurses, medically oriented persons , and religious. Laymen
interested in this problem will also gain deep insights into the many individuals afflicted with
this disorder.
John Harvey is a moral theologian and psychologist who has devoted more than 34 years
to studying, researching and counseling. He brings deep insight to this field of
homosexuality.
In this book , Father Harvey grounds his observations on the sound foundation of the
magisterial teaching of the Catholic Church and integrates medical, psychological and
psychiatric research into the various chapters.
In the first chapter, he discusses at length the definitions of homosexuality and the
distinctions between homosexual activity and orientation, compulsive and non~ompulsive
activity . In Chapter 2, he reviews the more recent theories concerning the origins of
homosexuality. In Chapter 5, he deals with the major dissenting theological views of Charles
Curran , Philip Keane , John McNeil and Gregory Baum. Following up on this is an excellent
section elucidating the argument from revelation and reason in favor ofthe official teaching
of the Church.
Chapter 7 is, perhaps, the most practical section of this book , as Harvey presents pastoral
perspectives and programs for those afflicted by this disorder. This chapter describes
one-to-one counseling and its relationship to group therapy and group spiritual direction.
This is an especially strong chapter. It gives hope to all that they can lead deep spiritual,
chaste lives. Relying heavily on spiritual and psychological counseling, following the 12 steps
of Alcoholics Anonymous, many homosex uals have been freed from the tyranny of their
own condition and gone on to live chaste and integrated lives. For special criticism , Harvey
points out the deficiencies of Dignity and New Ways Ministry, organizations of dissenting
Catholics.
In Chapter 8, he deals with the problems of the married homosexual , the apparent
ado lescent homosexual and AIDS. His ninth chapter is devoted to psychological and
pastoral reflections on pedophilia and its treatment, along with the ethical aspects of the
trea tment. The final chapter is a capsule summary of the entire book in which he succinctly
states his conclusions.
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